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STUDENT
ARTICLE
The Lautenberg Amendment:
Should the Federal Government be
Required to Notify State
Governments and Citizens when it
Enacts a Malum Prohibitum Criminal
Law whose Punishment is a Felony
Resulting in Extended Incarceration?
Charles M. Watts Jr.
[The maxim of ignorance of the law is no
excuse] is not intended to deny that criminal
liability, as well as civil, is founded on
blameworthiness. Such a denial would shock
the moral sense of any civilized community;
or, to put it another way, a law which
punished conduct which would not be
blameworthy in the average member of the
community would be too severe for that
community to bear.1
I. Introduction
A man owns a hunting rifle that he purchased
legally and properly registered years before. In fact, he
has been a hunter his whole life. He and his wife are in
the process of getting a divorce. As part of the divorce
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proceedings a temporary restraining order is issued
concerning financial matters, child support and custody,
and a general admonition not to threaten or harm his
wife. The man does not violate any terms contained in
the restraining order. Subsequently, this man is arrested
for violating a federal law that makes it a felony to be in
possession of firearm while subject to a restraining2
order. This law was not mentioned in the restraining
order, and the judge who issued it had not known of this
obscure federal law. If found guilty, this man faces up to
410 years in prison.
Much like the general rule of caveat emptor
regarding consumers, the criminal law has the maxim
that ignorance of the law is no defense. Mere possession
of a gun is not something that would occur to the average
person to be worthy of a federal felony. The severity of
the penalty, one might think, calls for the violator to be
morally blameworthy. Amazingly, in cases with similar
fact patterns, where defendants have argued that they
should have been given notice of the existence of this law
before being punished, the majority of courts have held
that ignorance of the law is no defense and found the
defendant guilty.
"Ignorance of the law is no defense" can make
sense in the case of minor civil infractions such as
parking laws or noise violations where the penalty is a
small fine. However, when severe criminal penalties are
the consequence, this form of "buyer beware" is unjust
when the act criminalized by the law is not morally
blameworthy in and of itself. If severe penalties are
legislated for such malum prohibitum acts - acts which are
not inherently morally wrong - it seems just to impose
them only if those affected were given notice that such
conduct violated the law and then knowingly violated
the law anyway.
Two recently passed federal laws, 18 U.S.C. §§
92 2 (g)(8) and 9 2 2 (g)(9 ), collectively referred to as the
Lautenberg Amendment, affect a substantial number of
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Americans and unbeknownst to them exact severe
penalties for the malum prohibitum act of possessing a
firearm. This Comment discusses the capricious nature
of the current enforcement of the Lautenberg Amendment
underscored in the recent case of United States v. Wilson.7
Part II of this Comment discusses the legislative history,
content, and enforcement of the Lautenberg Amendment.
Part III discusses the Lautenberg Amendment in
conjunction with the notice and fair warning requirements
of the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
Part IV analyzes the current efficacy of the Lautenberg
Amendment and advocates an extensive public
awareness campaign to increase compliance coupled
with punishment only in cases where defendants
knowingly violate the law.
II. Background
In America, once every 15 seconds a woman is
beaten by her husband or boyfriend." Domestic abuse is
the leading cause of injury among women. Roughly
1500 women each year are killed by their abusive
partner.0 Furthermore, seventy percent of these victims
are killed with a gun. In homes where guns are present
the overall risk of homicide being committed by a family
member or intimate partner is seven times greater than in
homes where guns are not present.12
In an effort to reduce this carnage, two federal gun
control laws, collectively referred to as the Lautenberg
Amendment, were recently passed to specifically take
guns out of the hands of domestic abusers. 3 One of these
laws, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), makes it illegal for anyone
subject to a protective order to be in possession of a
firearm.14 The other provision, 18 U.S.C. § 92 2 (g)(9), bars
gun possession for persons who have been convicted of a15
misdemeanor domestic violence offense. If found
guilty under either of these provisions, the penalty is a
felony conviction that could result in a prison term of up
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to ten years.
Curiously, each provision was enacted with little
publication or fanfare. Stranger still after the Lautenberg
Amendment became law the Justice Department failed to
take ste ps to notify state and local law enforcement or
courts.
The undetectable and circuitous path the
Lautenberg Amendment to the Gun Control Act of 1968
took to become law is unfortunate considering the
extraordinary impact it is having upon American
society.19 The impact - the instantaneous creation of at
least one million new felons - is all the more staggering
considering that general notice of this new law was not
forthcoming and that some recent federal court decisions
indicate that violation of the law occurs even when the
20
accused had no knowledge of the law's existence.
The Lautenberg Amendment has withstood
numerous Constitutional challenges in the federal
courts.2 ' This Comment focuses on whether the Lautenberg
Amendment has been enforced in such a way so that the
notice and fair warning requirement under the due
process clause has been violated. The combination of
recent cases considering this argument with Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the issue provides fertile ground
for judicial reexamination of the standards under which
persons can be convicted of malum prohibitum offenses.
22
III. United States v. Wilson: Discussion of the
Lautenberg Amendment in the Context of the
Notice and Fair Warning Requirement Under
the Due Process Clause
On September 10, 1996, Carleton Wilson had car
trouble and pulled his pickup truck to the side of the23
road. Shortly thereafter, an Illinois state police trooper
stopped to assist.2 4 During a routine check of Mr. Wilson's
driver's license, it was learned that there was an
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outstanding warrant for his arrest for failing to appear in
court. Wilson was arrested and a search of his truck
26yielded three guns. Six months later, Wilson was
indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g)(8 ) for illegally
possessing a firearm affecting interstate commerce while
27
subject to a domestic relations order of protection.
The restraining order had been issued during28
divorce proceedings a year before the arrest. Wilson
had represented himself at all hearings and there was no
evidence that he violated any condition specified in the
restraining order.29 The judge had not told Wilson that
he was barred from possessing firearms even though he
could have made such a condition part of Wilson's
restraining order under Illinois State law.30
Unfortunately for Wilson, although the divorce
had been finalized, the order of protection had neverS 31
been rescinded. In the district court, he was convicted
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 92 2 (g)(8), fined $7,500 and
32 33
sentenced to 41 months in prison. Wilson appealed.
In United States v. Wilson, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed Wilson's conviction noting
that he had violated "a relatively new and obscure
portion of 18 U.S.C. § 922." 34 After dispensing with35
several Constitutional challenges , the court held that
Wilson's violation of 18 U.S.C. § 92 2 (g)(8) would stand
over his objection that he had not received adequate
notice or fair warning of the existence of the statute
36because ignorance of the law is no excuse. In a
vigorous dissent, Judge Richard Posner argued that
because the act of possessing a firearm in and of itself is
not morally blameworthy and the law making that
possession illegal for Wilson was unknown even to the
judge who issued the restraining order, Wilson should
37
not be punished.
The majority opinion rejected the argument that
Wilson's Fifth Amendment due process rights were
violated. 38 First, the court held that fair warning and
notice was a question of whether the statute in question
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is "sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to
it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its
penalties." 39 Because 18 U.S.C. § 92 2(g)(8) was clearly
written there could be no successful "void for vagueness"40
challenge. Fair warning could not be violated simply
because the government failed to inform Wilson that the
law existed.
Secondly, the court held that whether Wilson
knew of the law or not is irrelevant because "[t]he
traditional rule in American jurisprudence is that
ignorance of the law is no defense to a criminalS 4 2
prosecution." Wilson's case did not fall under an
exception to this maxim because 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) was
not "highly technical" 43 nor did it exact a penalty for44
failing to act. Furthermore, the court held that the term
"knowingly" referred to knowledge of the act itself and
45
not to knowledge of the law that prohibited the act.
Therefore, because Wilson knew that he possessed
firearms, he knowingly committed the act that the law
defined as a crime.
In his dissent, Chief Judge Richard A. Posner
asserted that there should be a balancing of the
"ignorance of the law is no excuse" maxim with the
principle that it is wrong to convict a person of a crime
whose acts are morally blameless.47 According to Posner,
Wilson's omission to turn in his guns is not morally
blameworthy because he could not have suspected that48
possession of a gun was wrong. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) is
malum prohibitum and therefore does not define an act -
possession of guns - that one would intuitively know to
be at odds with the moral code of American society.49 To
Posner, federal case law provides a rough guide to follow
in measuring the criminal act against the mores of
American society to determine whether knowledge of the50
law must be proved. Child pornography and the51
possession of hand grenades were held to be examples
of acts morally at odds with societal norms that did not
require the actor's knowledge of their illegality, while the
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importation of ivory in violation of the African Elephant
Conservation Act required knowledge.52 The dissent
inferred that Wilson's acts are more like the latter
violation than the former because legal ownership of
guns by private individuals enjoys a long and
widespread tradition of general acceptance.53
Another factor for Judge Posner in determining
whether ignorance of the law should excuse its violation
is the extent to which the government has put the public
on notice of a new malum prohibitum law. Prior to
Wilson's conviction, Posner noted that approximately
160,000 violations of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) occurred in the
four years since the law's inception and only 10 cases
filed federal courts throughout the United States.
Furthermore, the Department of Justice had not taken
any measures to inform either law enforcement agencies
56
or the state courts. In fact, during argument of Wilson,
the prosecutor admitted to the court that the Office of the
United States Attorney for the Southern District of Illinois
had not made an effort prior to Wilson's trial to notify the
local judiciary of the new law. 7 Predictably, the judge
who issued the restraining order to Wilson did not know
of the existence of the law.
Judge Posner gave two reasons that would make a
defendant morally culpable for ignorance of the law and
59
concluded that Wilson did not meet either of these tests.
If the average person's conscience would tell them that
the act was wrong in and of itself, then notice of the
illegality of the act can be presumed and ignorance
60
would be no defense. In other instances, a law could be
obscure and nonintuitive to the general population, but
could substantially bear upon a particular person's
activities to the extent that it is reasonable to presume
knowledge of that law.6' For example, if a person was in
the business of shipping pharmaceuticals and violated
criminal laws governing that activity, ignorance of the
law would not excuse its violation because this person
should have known the law.62
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Posner argued that Wilson's lack of knowledge of
18 U.S.C. § 9 22 (g)(8) did not fit into either of these
criteria, and therefore he should not be punished.
63
Wilson could not have reasonably guessed that his
conduct violated the law, and without notification by the
judge who issued his restraining order, according to
Posner, Wilson was not morally culpable. 64 If the
expectation is that the average man is supposed to read
through and learn the federal criminal code, then to
Posner the law is a trap.65
If none of the conditions that make it
reasonable to dispensewith proof of
knowledge or the law is present, then to
intone"ignorance of the law is no defense" is
to condone a violationof fundamental
principles for the sake of judicial economy in
. . .. . . . 66
the administration of criminal justice.
Judge Posner next discussed a string of United
States Supreme Court cases that have held that there are
exceptions to "ignorance of the law is no defense" and
argued that Wilson's acts are excusable under their
67
reasoning. This Comment will add substance to the
Posner dissent's discussion of these Supreme Court cases
to more comprehensively describe current jurisprudence
on the status of "ignorance of the law is no defense."
The seminal case that carved out an exception to
68this maxim is Lambert v. California. In Lambert, a woman
who had previously been convicted of a felony failed to
register with the Los Angeles Police as required by a
municipal code ordinance.69 The majority stated, "[t]he
question is whether a registration act of this character
violated due process where it is applied to a person who
has no actual knowledge of his duty to register, and
where no showing is made of the probability of such
knowledge." The Court noted that "[e]ngrained in our
concept of due process is the requirement of notice" and
"the principle is... appropriate where a person, wholly
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passive and unaware of any wrongdoing, is brought to
the bar of justice for condemnation in a criminal case." 70
The conduct was wholly passive because it was
"unaccompanied by any activity whatever, mere
presence in the city being the test." Lambert was
unaware of wrongdoing because "circumstances which
might move one to inquire as to the necessity of
registration [were] completely lacking." 72 The Supreme
Court held that the municipal ordinance violated the due
process requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment when
applied to a person such as Lambert whose act was
passive and who had no actual knowledge of the law.73
The Court's rationale is worth quoting at length.
[T]his appellant on first becoming aware of
her duty to register was given no opportunity
to comply with the law and avoid its penalty,
even though her default was entirely innocent.
She could but suffer the consequences of the
ordinance, namely, conviction with the
imposition of heavy criminal penalties
thereunder. We believe that actual knowledge
of the duty to register or proof of the
probability of such knowledge and
subsequent failure to comply are necessary
before a conviction under the ordinance can
stand. As Holmes wrote in The Common Law,
'A law which punished conduct which would
not be blameworthy in the average member of
the community would be too severe for that
community to bear.' Its severity lies in the
absence of an opportunity either to avoid the
consequences of the law or to defend any
prosecution brought under it. Where a person
did not know of the duty to register and
where there was no proof of the probability of
such knowledge, he may not be convicted
consistently with due process. Were it
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otherwise, the evil would be as great as it is
when the law is written in print too fine to
read or in a language foreign to the
community.
In Wilson, JudgePosner found all of the same
circumstances present. Wilson's criminal "act" was
really an omission because mere possession of a firearm
was all that was required to violate the law.76 Circumstances
such as moral culpability and notice of the law, either on
the restraining order itself or by the issuing judge at the
hearing, that would have moved Wilson to comply with77
the law were totally lacking. Also, when Wilson
became aware of violating the law, he was iven no
opportunity to comply and avoid penalty. In short,
according to Posner, the fact pattern in Wilson mirrors
that in Lambert and called for the same result.79
The basic premise of Lambert has been supported
in recent Supreme Court cases where the Court has
further eroded the efficacy of the "ignorance of the law is
no excuse" maxim where the defendant lacked knowledge8o
of the crime they were charged with. Four cases,
Liparota v. United States,1 Ratzlaf v. United States, Staples
83 84
v. United States," and United States v. X-Citement Video,
when taken together, demonstrate a pattern of requiring
morally culpable conduct for finding a violation of a
federal criminal law.8
In Liparota, the Liporata brothers, owners of a
Chicago sandwich shop, were arrested for repeatedly
buying federal food stamps from recipients for less than
86face value. The federal law regarding food stamps
criminally penalized one who "knowingly ... transfers,
acquires, alters, or possesses" food stamps in an87
unauthorized manner. The Liporata's defense was that
their act was not morally blameworthy in and of itself
and that they did not know it was illegal to buy foodS. 88
stamps from recipients. The Supreme Court held that
to convict the Liparotas under this federal statute
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required proof that they "knew that his conduct was
unauthorized or illegal." Thus to be convicted under
this malum prohibitum federal criminal statute, one must
have knowledge of the law.
In Ratzlaf, a man was arrested for depositing
numerous cashiers' checks in an effort to evade the
reporting requirement for cash transactions of $10,000 or
more in violation of the Money Laundering Control
Act.90 At trial, a jury had found that Ratzlaf knew of the
$10,000 reporting requirement and sought to evade it.9'
The Supreme Court held that in order to convict Ratzlaf
of the crime, the government had to prove that he knew
that structuring his transactions into amounts less than
92$10,000 was in violation of the reporting requirement.
Because Ratzlaf was ignorant of this law and his act -
depositing less than $10,000 in cash numerous times over
a short period - he was morally blameless in and of itself,
he could not be convicted of the offense.93
The Staples case concerned the illegal possession of
a machine gun. The defendant was accused of
converting a semi-automatic weapon into an automatic
weapon in violation of federal gun control law.95 Staples
maintained that he did not know his gun was automatic
or that there was a law prohibiting possession of one.96
Reversing the district court, the Supreme Court held that
the government had the burden of proving that Staples
97knew that his gun was an automatic weapon.
The fourth case, United States v. X-Citement Video,
had its roots in the infamous story of Traci Lords, a
woman who at the tender age of 15 had starred in
numerous adult movies.98 Shortly after this story broke,
an undercover officer purchased videotapes featuring the
young Ms. Lords.99 X-Citement was charged for
knowingly transporting or shipping images of "minor[s]
engag[ed] in sexually explicit conduct." The Supreme
Court held that to convict the owner of X-Citement Video
of this crime, the government had to prove that the
owner knew that videos he sold contained images of Ms.
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Lords when she was under age 18."°
Liparota, Ratzlaf, Staples, and X-Citement Video all
required that in order for a person to be convicted of a
crime that made a morally blameless act illegal that it
must be proved that the person knew their conduct was102
against the law. Like Lambert, these cases uphold the
notion that it is wrong to convict a morally blameless
person of a crime for committing an act that he had no
reason to believe was wrong.103
IV. Analysis
It should be a bedrock principle of American
jurisprudence that in order to punish someone for
violation of a criminal law that they should be morally
culpable. T0 In most cases, the criminal law is self-evident
because it makes conduct that society deems immoral an
illegal act. One can be presumed to know that stealing or
battery is against the law.
Wilson, by simply owning a gun, did not commit
an act that made him morally culpable. For the entire
history of the United States up to 1994 possessing a gun
while under a domestic relations restraining order or
after being convicted of a misdemeanor was perfectly
legal. In fact, it was not even categorized as a civil
wrong. Then, first as one provision in a 300 page
Omnibus Crime bill'05 and then as an amendment to a
Postal Appropriations bill,6 the status of possessing a
gun by such persons is now a serious felony. To turn
heretofore innocent conduct into a possible 10-year
prison term with the lifetime blemish of a felony criminal
record is extraordinary.
The need to protect women and children from
abusive men is great. It is justifiable to prohibit those
who have demonstrated a propensity for committing acts
of domestic violence, whether manifested in a
misdemeanor domestic violence conviction or a
domestic-relations restraining order, from possessing
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guns. Men who have the capacity to beat their wives,
girlfriends or children to the extent that they are held
accountable under what is often an inadequately
enforced and prosecuted area of the law' °7 have placed
themselves in a shameful category of persons clearly
separable from the general population. If these people
are dispossessed of their guns, statistics convincingly
indicate that there would be a significant reduction in
domestic homicides.108
However, instead of publicizing such a radical
new course in the law and enlisting the help and support
of state and local law enforcement, the Department of
Justice decided to spring a draconian trap on a handful of
people. By way of analogy, enforcement of the
Lautenberg Amendment by the Department of Justice is
like a school of piranhas attacking a herd of cattle
crossing a stream. A thousand cows cross an innocent-
looking stream and unbeknownst to the rest of the herd,
one cow disappears underwater and is eaten alive.
Enforcement of the Lautenberg Amendment gun
provisions should be done more like a pack of wolves
than a school of piranhas. The Department of Justice
should howl to the moon and appear on the edge of the
field. The herd of cattle would then be aware of the
danger.
The most effective way for the Lautenberg
Amendment's objective of reducing domestic homicide
to be achieved is to have people obey the law. The
Department of Justice in a combined effort with local
authorities could systematically comb through the
criminal records and find the name of everyone who has
committed a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.
The Department could then send notices to these people
requiring them to get rid of their firearms. Also, every
judge handing down a conviction for domestic violence
should notify the guilty that they are no longer allowed
to have a gun for the rest of their lives. Likewise, every
judge issuing a restraining order should be required to
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notify the recipient that they are not allowed to have a
gun while under the order. After these steps are taken, it
would be appropriate to begin to punish those who
violate the law. The threshold where "ignorance of the
law is no excuse" could be justly applied will have been
crossed. The result of proceeding in this fashion would
yield a lower rate of homicide with the law informing
and improving the conduct of the citizens. A significant
stigma would be forever placed on those who are violent
to their loved ones.
On the other hand, a more vigorous enforcement
of the Lautenberg Amendment without first engaging in
a notification and publicity campaign could lead to the
unfortunate result of the law being repealed. Each year
between 100,000 to 150,000 are convicted of misdemeanor
domestic violence offenses'09 and more than 100,000
become subject to a restraining order.1 Combining this
large group with all those convicted of domestic violence
misdemeanors in the past yields a substantial number of
people who would view the Lautenberg Amendment as
too harsh. A few well-publicized cases where somewhat
sympathetic defendants are sent to the penitentiary and
the grouping of the not so morally corrupt with the truly
evil into the same category of banned-from-owning-a-
gun-forever would trouble many people. However, were
there to be a public education initiative modeled on the
efforts to decrease drunk driving that accompanied
significant strengthening of those laws, the Lautenberg
Amendment would enjoy large support among the
general public. Most people now regard drunk driving
as a morally culpable act that deserves severe
punishment. The same shift in public opinion would
occur in regards to banning the ownership of guns from
those who commit acts of domestic violence.
V. Conclusion
United States v. Wilson was a poor interpretation of
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the current status of the notice and fair warning
requirement of the due process clause. Judge Posner's
dissent, when combined with the reasoning in a line of
Supreme Court precedents, calls for a different outcome.
As consumers of the law, all Americans should dread if it
comes to pass that persons who are not morally culpable
can be convicted of a crime they had no reason to know
existed. The Lautenberg Amendment is a needed law,
but one that needs to be made known to local law
enforcement, courts, and the general public so that it will
be complied with and supported. Once educated,
Americans would properly associate gun possession by
perpetrator of domestic violence as a morally culpable
act deserving of punishment.
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